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AFTERWORD

STEVE WINTER'S A CLEARING IN THE FOREST*
Gary Mindat
Law is a cerebral enterprise. Much of what happens,
happens in the mind. One might think that lawyers, judges,
and legal academics would have developed by a sophisticated
understanding of how the legal mind does its work in the law.
And, yet surprisingly, until now, there is no serious body of
literature on the workings of the legal mind. How is it that
judges and lawyers have entirely overlooked the important role
of human cognition in the law? And what permits judges and
lawyers to say without any queasiness that they know what it
means to "think like a lawyer" when they in fact know so little
about how lawyers think? These are questions that call out for
a response and yet, not until now, few have bothered with such
questions. The fact is, we are still in the dark ages when it
comes to understanding how the mind works in the law. In this
Symposium, readers have an opportunity to consider one of the
first academic efforts to explain how humans actually make
legal reasoning possible.
By most accounts, the mind is the thinking machine
that processes information and permits lawyers to "think like a
lawyer." And, how does this machine actually do its work? In
law school, law students learn logic and fallacy of legal
arguments. The "IRAC" method for writing law, as every law
student is taught to learn, is based on syllogistic reasoning,
* 02002. Gary Minda. All Rights Reserved.
t Visiting Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law (2001-2002);
Visiting Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law (2002-2003); Professor of
Law, Brooklyn Law School.
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which is thought to be the basic mode of legal reasoning in its
purest sense. Issues are identified, relevant rules are
discovered; the relevant rules are then "applied" to the facts,
and out comes the "conclusion"-Judgment for plaintiff, or
defendant. It is all about getting the "right" case in the "right"
category. For sophisticated practitioners and judges, the
reasoning process is a matter of common sense and pragmatic
judgment. As Judge Richard A. Posner once described it in one
of his famous moments of honest reflection: when confronted
with difficult legal controversies in the law, experienced judges
"roll up their sleeves" and "get a job done."' Of course, the
messy job of "how to do it" is left largely unanswered. For
Justice Scalia, legal reasoning is mainly the exercise in
following the rules, with balancing and totality-ofcircumstances tests to cover those cases where the rules do not
quite fit the facts.2 As it turns out, however, balancing and
totality of the circumstances are not the exception; they are
usually the norm and when these tests are applied legal
reasoning is far from consistent or predictable.
The fact is that there is little meaningful discussion to
be found in the case law or in the legal literature on how
reason does work in the law. Phrases like "reasoned
elaboration" or "neutral principles" from the 1950s legal
process culture only obfuscate what really happens when
judges do law. An unescapable conclusion to be gleaned from
the work of sophisticated legal philosophers like Ronald
Dworkin is that reason is something that judges do when they
make the law the "best it can be" with cryptic references to the
"practical wisdom" of legal culture.' For all his grandiloquent
talk of what philosopher-king judges might do in the law,
Dworkin practices a kind of "as if'jurisprudence that never
reveals how it is real world judges are supposed to "reason"
their way to the right answer in the law. We are thus left
wondering what exactly is it that judges and lawyers do when
they are "doing" law?

' Richard A. Posner, Bad Faith, NEW REPUBLIC, JUNE 9, 1997, at 34
(reviewing DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (fin de siecle) (1997)).
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1178-80 (1989).
3See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986).
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Recent work in the interdisciplinary field of cognitive
sciences, however, makes it possible for the first time to
understand how reason in the law does work.4 Much of the
learning in cognitive science is coming to define a new field of
legal studies known as cognitive legal studies, due largely to
the work of Steven L. Winter.5 We are. celebrating with this
symposium Winter's most recent text, A Clearingin the Forest:
Law, Life, and Mind. A Clearing in the Forest6 is the
culmination of many years of work based on the recent findings
of cognitive science about how the human mind works in the
law. A Clearingin the Forestis a compelling meditation on how
the new learning about human cognition is informing some of
the most intuitive understandings of the reasoning process
used in the law, as well as challenging many
misunderstandings and misconceptions about the nature of
reason itself. After reading Winter, one can no longer deny the
relevance of cognitive science in the law.
I.

THE CENTRAL METAPHORS

A Clearing in the Forest begins with a short story from
William James' book, On a Certain Blindness in Human
Being.7 This story sets forth a metaphor that helps to explain
Winter's account of how law works and why law is irrepressibly
an imaginative, creative quality of human reason. The story is
about a trip that William James took to the mountains of
North Carolina. On that trip, James said that he learned
something about how human imagination constrains meaning.
4

The field of cognitive science is largely the result of the ground breaking

works of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER,
MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIc METAPHOR (1989); MARK
JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND

REASON (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS (1987);
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By (1980).

5 See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative
Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 963 (1991); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and
Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990); Steven L.
Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning,87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989).
6 STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND
(2001). 7
THE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM JAMES: A COMPREHENSIVE EDITION 629, 630-31

(John J. McDermott ed., 1968).
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James explains his initial impression of seeing the "coves" or
"clearings" early settlers had cut into the forest in the valleys
of the mountains to clear away a space for a log cabin and
farm. In viewing these coves or clearings for the first time,
James reports that his initial reaction was one of repulsion;
what he saw was "unmitigated squalor."8 In viewing the
remaining charred stumps where trees once stood, James
remarks on the destruction of the forest, and how what had
"improved" was "hideous, a sort of ulcer, without a single
element of artificial grace to make up for the loss of Nature's
beauty."9
In asking a mountaineer about this, James said he
wanted to know "[w]hat sort of people are they who have to
make these new clearings?"" The mountaineer replied: "All of
us.... Why, we ain't happy here, unless we are getting one of
these coves under cultivation."" James reports that in hearing
this he instantly came to understand that he had been "losing
the inward significance of the situation," and that his
experience had blinded him to the meaning of the cove to the
settlers. 2 Where the clearing had once been seen as destruction
and "denudation," the same spaces could be seen as a source of
pride and beauty by those who chopped away the trees and
made the forest their home. As James came to see, when the
people who lived there looked at the clearing and the "hideous
stumps" they saw "personal victory . . . honest sweat,
persistent toil and final rewardt.""8 The clearing that was "an
ugly picture on the retina" to James, was to the people who
lived in the clearings "a symbol redolent with moral memories
and sang a very paean of duty, struggle, and success." 4
One way to understand the relevance of James' story to
Winter's project is to consider how the relationship between the
"forest" and the "clearing" has been imaginatively used by
writers to talk about the importance of law. Hence, in Robert

WINTER, supra note 6, at ix.
0
10Id.
Id.
1

1Id.
12
Id.
13WINTER, supranote 6, at ix.
14Id.
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Bolt's A Man for All Seasons,5 another story that figures
importantly in the beginning of Winter's book,16 Bolt describes
a conversation between Sir Thomas More and his future sonin-law, Roper, about the importance of showing deference to
the law in the face of evil. Roper wants to do whatever is
necessary to destroy evil, even if it means disregarding the law.
Sir Thomas asks Roper: "What would you do? Cut a great road
through the law to get after the Devil?" Roper responds: "I'd cut
down every law in England to do that." Sir Thomas then
explains:
Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned around
on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This
country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-man's laws,
not God's-and if you cut them down-and you're just the man to do
it-do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
would blow then?7

Here, Robert Bolt relies upon his reader's imagination
of a forest to derive the importance of the law. Each tree in the
forest is a law, and if the trees are cut down they will not be
any protection for man. Unlike James's story that focuses on
the meaning of the "clearing"; Bolt encourages his reader to
focus on the meaning of the trees in the forest for an
understanding of why it is important to show fidelity to the
law.
In beginning his book with these stories, Winter asks us
to consider how human thought is "irreducibly imaginative."18
When we read these stories we instinctively understand the
meaning of the "forest" because we share the author's
experiences with the forest. The forest can both protect us and
be something that needs to be tamed and civilized. The shared
experiences about the nature of a "forest" thus become domain
from which we draw information for understanding something
else. This is how metaphor works cognitively. We draw
information from a domain that we know about to help explain
the target domain of the unknown. Metaphor, of course, is only
one of several cognitive mechanisms used in human thought
'sROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1960).
" See WINTER, supranote 6, at 1.
"7BOLT, supra note 15, at 66.
"aWinter, supra note 6, at 5.
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that Winter explores to ascertain how reason works in the law.
A principal claim of Winter's book is that developments in
cognitive theory make it possible to describe the cognitive
mechanisms that enable humans to reason.
What is striking about Winter's two introductory stories
by James and Bolt is that they help to illustrate what is wrong
with the way "reason" is understood in the law. As Winter
explains, the standard account of legal reasoning is based on
the "objectivist" view that "understands the world as made up
of determinate, mind-independent objects with inherent
characteristics or 'essences.'"19 The basic notion that is widely
held is that "reason" works because we can ascertain the truth
of observable features of our world. In thinking of reason in
this way, it becomes easy to see why those in the law would
think of legal reasoning as "abstracting from a judicial opinion
or other authoritative legal text the principles that express the
necessary and sufficient
conditions, properties, or criteria that
20
characterize it."
Winter argues that this is not how we actually reason in
the law. As literary writers know, however, reason is
imaginative and grounded in shared experience. Winter can
thus be read as advancing a literary or poetic insight. He
proclaims: "[Riationality is imaginative and grounded means,
quite simply, that we use physical and social experience and
general cultural knowledge to categorize and understand."1
Much of the effort of legal theorists is based on the goal of
justifying law as a constraint on the human mind. Hence, Sir
Thomas tells Roper that all hell will be unleashed if others
follow his advice and fail to follow the commands of the law.
Constraint is what keeps judges in line and it is constraint that
is thought to limit judicial imagination. This is why Richard A.
Posner does not believe that law and literature have much in
common; lawyers and judges, unlike literary writers, are
required to follow and respect the conventions of the law.2
Much of the writing about law is thus aimed at justifying law
as constraint; meta-theories are offered and considerable time
" Id. at9.
20Id.at 7-8.
21Id. at 12.
22

See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MSUNDERSTOOD

RELATION (1988).
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is devoted to debating the existence or non-existence of reasons
for constraint.
A second principle claim of the book is that in order to
understand how the mind does work, we need to "shift our
focus away from metastructures (or lack thereof) to the
cognitive and cultural infrastructures, if we are going to make
any sense of the phenomenon of law."2 Instead of looking
outside to find the structures that are thought to give law
regularity as a source of constraint on human action, Winter
examines the inner world of human cognition.24 The fact that
the law does work is what Winter wants to explain. He argues
that by looking to the infrastructures of human cognition we
can begin to understand how and why the phenomena of
human persuasion works in the law to give law its regularity
in application and predictability. The "recurring structure" and
"repeatable pattern" that we find in law can in fact be
explained cognitively in terms of the bodily experiences and
cultural context.2
In this important sense, Winter's text helps to bring out
the significance of mental context for better understanding the
contingent nature of legal thought. Winter wants us to read the
law by considering the viewpoint of the mountaineer in
William James' story. Winter wants us, in other words, to
understand that "legal meaning must be lived if it is to
continue to be recognized as such." 6 In order to live in the life
of the law one must come to grips with the human dimension of
cognitive thought as it works in the law to do things. The
promise of cognitive legal studies is that it offers us a way to
better understand how concepts and rights in the law are
connected to human imagination grounded in the world of
experience and culture.
When William James saw the coves cut into the forest of
the North Carolina mountains for the first time, his mind's eye
reacted to the way humans had destroyed a beautiful forest.
What he failed to see was the meaning of the coves for all of
those who lived and died on the land. What he failed to see was
that the coves cut into the forest were a source of beauty and
24 WINTER,

Id.

supranote 6, at 11.

' Id. at 333-47.
26

1Id. at 351.
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hope for those who struggled to survive in the mountains.
What James came to see was a new source of meaning in the
practices and commitments of the people who lived on the
mountains. Winter wants us to rediscover the meaning of our
law in our own practices and commitments. To do what he
wants us to do, we must first come to understand how reason
in law actually works and what it means. This is what one can
learn from reading Winter's text.
Winter's text demonstrates how "meaning-making" in
the law is shaped and constructed from human imagination
situated within a physical, cultural, social, and ideological
milieu. I read Winter as arguing that we should better
understand the meaning we make in the law in order to
understand how law might better serve us in creating the kind
of society we desire. For Winter, the new lessons about the
mind should help us better understand how we can do things
with the law in the course of constructing and reconstructing
the world in which we live." In doing so, we can discover what
it means to be human in the law. As Winter explains:
[Oince we recognize that meaning is constituted in our imaginative
interactions with the environment, we can begin to understand
ourselves as human-that is, as beings who think in terms of our
situation, form our categories in contact with our experience, and
modify that situation and that experience by the meaning we
discover in them.'

II.

THE COGNITIVE INSIGHTS OF A CLEARING IN THE

FOREST.

A Clearing in the Forest offers some important new
ideas about how reason works in the law. Drawing from the
work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson and other cognitive
scientists, Winter develops his insights from three basic ideas
about the nature of human cognition: (1) reason in the law is
embodied and imaginative and not syllogistic and logical as
some believe; (2) metaphor is a central modality of reason in
law, and not merely an ornamental device used to spice up
language; and (3) ideas and concepts in the law can be shown
27Id.

at 356.

28WINTER, supra note 6, at 356-57.
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to have a contingent grounding in human experience.29 These
three insights challenge some of the basic notions about how
language, reason, concepts, and categories work to give
meaning to things in the law and how law's claim to reason can
be put into question.
My own work in the law of boycott reveals how Winter's
three foundational principles of human cognition can explain
the mess that judges have created with their use of traditional
forms of legal reasoning in dealing with boycott questions in
different substantive areas of the law.3" Judges have organized
their knowledge and understandings of boycott phenomena by
reference to imaginative categories structured by idealized
cognitive models ("ICMs") of boycott. These models are used in
adjudication to create legal categories that distinguish between
boycotts of different groups-labor, civil rights, and commercial
organizations. The legal categories operate as fixed points in
legal reasoning, even though the imaginary boundary lines
between the categories are quite transparent and highly
revisable. The models give rise to distinct prototypical
cognitive effects that judges use to render what they believe to
be legally correct answers about boycott activities of different
groups in society.
Thus, labor boycotts, framed by an ICM arising out of
the meaning of Trade Union unrest in the early part of the last
century, have been used to deny otherwise peaceful, and
obviously political, labor boycotts of constitutional protection
under the First Amendment. On the other hand, civil rights
boycotts, framed by an ICM arising out of governmentally
sanctioned racial discrimination, have been accorded First
Amendment protection. The inconsistency posed by the case
law is never seriously examined because the models used to
frame legal analysis about boycotts arise from substantively
different
imaginative
grounds-mob
violence
(labor),
democratic participation and self-help (civil rights), or
competitive process (business/antitrust). What reveals the
imaginative and metaphoric nature of the boycott decisions are
the colorful images that judges use to justify their results. In
the early common law of labor boycotts, judges labeled
29

Id. at 5-6.
30 GARY MINDA, BOYCOTt IN AMERICA: How IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY
SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999).
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otherwise peaceful labor boycotts as "acts of murder," and even
today secondary boycotts are described as if they were like
"cancer" that must be cut out of the body.3' The imaginative
representation of boycott as "murder" seems strange, but it
makes perfect sense in light of the prototypical effects of an
imagined category of boycott that equates peaceful laborboycott activity with uncivilized, animalistic behavior.
We cannot expect to understand how legal reasoning
works in the law of boycott, or anywhere else for that matter,
until we understand how metaphor performs cognitively to
justify and legitimate highly contested issues in the law. We
can continue to pretend that the law is neutral and logical, but
only if we deny the metaphoric nature of how reason works. As
Gary Peller has insisted: "[Llegal discourse can present itself
as neutral and determinate only to the extent it denies its own
metaphoric starting points."'
A Clearing in the Forest offers a methodology for
discovering the metaphoric starting points of law's reason. In
doing so, Winter helps to reveal the politics of law which
critical legal studies scholars famously argued in their earlier
critiques of law's reason.33 Winter uses the new learning about
the way the mind works from cognitive science to explore why
law does work as "law" and why law is a profoundly ideological
activity. Law works as "law" because judges and practitioners
rely upon a shared "social process of persuasion" that operates
in terms of background normative experience.
For example, when judges thought of labor boycotts as
"acts of murder" in early common law, they relied upon a
highly ideological understanding of the meaning of labor
associations that associated labor activity with acts of
violence. 4 The horrific images of riotous mobs and bombs
exploding, made famous in the history of the labor movement,
became the linguistic ground for legal vilification of labor
boycotts in the modern era. The ideological dimension of
boycott law has since become pronounced, as Winter argues in
"' See id. at 33-42, 101-08.
32 Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1182
(1985).

See

GARY

MINDA,

POSTMODERN

JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END ch. 6 (1995).
34MINDA, supranote 26, at 47-52.
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his book,3 5 precisely because "judges are [today] acting in good
faith, unaware of the normative entailments of the conceptual
materials with which they work." 6 It is the commonplace
nature of metaphoric reason that gives law its ideological
content. The imaginative nature of the legal mind, assuming
that we can talk of such a thing, is the product of a particular
context, a particular culture, and a unique institutional
setting. What Winter's text does then is to reveal how the socalled rational modes of legal analysis are in fact the product of
a highly selective legal imagination that has developed out of
the ground of its own institutional, cultural, and personal
experiences.

III.

REPTILES IN THE WEEDS

In reading the William James story about his
experiences in the forest of North Carolina mountains, I am
reminded of what Justice Stevens had said about the dangers
of the forest. To quote Justice Stevens: "A court must be wary
of claim that the true color of a forest is better revealed by
reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of countless
freestanding trees." 7 This quote was used by Justice Stevens to
explain the pitfalls of using case precedent to explain the legal
meaning of boycott. Justice Stevens explained that the word
"boycott" was like the word "conspiracy," in that, in the law, it
had a chameleon-like nature; these words were capable of
changing its meaning from context to context.3 8 Once we begin
to focus on context as a ground for ascertaining the meaning of
things, we begin to run into the same interpretative problems
that judges and lawyers face on an everyday basis in their
attempt to apply the law to "facts." The same imaginative
structures that enable judges to apply laws in surprisingly new
ways renders the entire ground of context like quick sandregularity of law can be swallowed up at any moment by
surprisingly new ideas about the facts and context.

WINTER, supra note 6, at 331.

"Id. at 331.

37 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 934 (1982).
38 Id.
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Consider, James's story about the "clearing" that had
been cut into the forest of the North Carolina mountains that
initially caught his attention and imagination. In observing
those clearings, James learned to understand how meaning
was contingent upon the actions of the people who cut the
coves into the forest. However, that same context may conceal
a long lost meaning that has since been repressed in the
imagination of the people now living in the coves. Maybe
William James should have reflected more on how the land
that the mountaineer cleared came at the expense of Native
Americans who were driven from the forest. Their cognitive
imagination has been wiped clean from the landscape. Maybe
their blood and lost culture is one of the reptiles hidden in the
forest that Justice Stevens warned us about. The reptile is
always there hiding in the weeds and waits to be discovered by
the eye of an imaginative observer. Once discovered, the reptile
comes out of the weeds and we are faced with new and possibly
dangerous interpretative accounts. We have largely forgotten
the ground that was once the world of another culture because
our law and its reason no longer provide us with a means for
discovering knowledge of that world. We should be wondering
if there are other reptiles hidden in the forest. A Clearing in
the Forest reminds us that unless we get beyond the
sedimentations of meaning we have created with our human
imagination, we will, as Winter explains, "remain prisoners of
the social field-the very clearing in the forest-that we
ourselves have made."3 9
The problem is that the legal mind is wedded to a
sedimented legal culture that is ideologically structured to
persuade us that reason in the law works like a machine to
logically manufacture outcomes or results. The ideology of the
legal culture also creates its own imaginative world for dealing
with the complexities of life. The legal culture thus motivates
us to think of the judge as a neutral decision maker who
logically follows the rules laid down. Ironically, the legal
culture cements the view of legal reasoning as constraint in the
minds of judges and lawyers by reference to a host of
imaginative metaphors that imagine the rule of law as stable
and determinant authority. The cognitive tools used in legal
39WINTER, supra note 6, at 356.
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analysis are used by judges as if they were neutral, when the
tools are skewed by normative assumptions drawn from the
context and background of legal culture. The law works,
however, because legal actors instinctively rely on a host of
subtle cognitive tools to give law and legal persuasion the
appeal of justification and regularity.
The grossly under-theorized nature of reason in law
merits attention, and Steve Winter's book is one of the most
ambitious efforts to date to shed new light on the problem.
Winter's contribution not only breaks new ground in
understanding how reason in the law does work; it also
provides a new dialogue for better appreciating the human
dimensions of law generally. The critical cognitive tools of
analysis that Winter offers allows one to discover the "reptiles"
as well as get at the meaning behind the "trees," "clearings,"
and other imaginative features of the "forest" we humans have
created in our discourses about law. For that we owe Winter a
measure of gratitude for laboring so long in the developing
coves of cognitive legal studies. It is thus bitter-sweet that he
will be leaving us here at Brooklyn Law School for new
challenges and new honors at Wayne State University School
of Law. I, for one, thank him for being an intellectually
stimulating and committed colleague and friend. He will be
missed.

